Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices

Françoise Forges
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Françoise Forges: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE); Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS)

No 1994007, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We survey some recent results on implementation of competitive solutions in differential economies. Extending to this context Arrow and Debreu’s definitions raises many conceptual issues. For instance, some properties of rational expectations equilibria may appear as paradoxical. In order to provide this approach with foundations, it has become usual to show that competitive solutions are implementable, namely coincide with the strategic equilibria of an appropriate scenario (i.e. a game). This typically leads to models that involve a large number of agents’ replicas, where every individual agent becomes negligible. We specially analyse the effects of such constructions on the incentive compatibility constraints that are related with agents information transmission.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 1994-02-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1994007

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