Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Failures

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2001029, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The novelty is that we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device, where each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device.

JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2000-11-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-29.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2004)
Working Paper: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2004)
Working Paper: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2003)
Working Paper: Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Faulures (2002)
Working Paper: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001029

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().