A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure

Laszlo Goerke

No 1998025, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

JEL-codes: C78 D82 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 1998-06-01
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Working Paper: A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure (1997)
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