The German Doctrine of the Budget

Walter James Shepard

American Political Science Review, 1910, vol. 4, issue 1, 52-62

Abstract: The evolution of parliamentary government in Germany proceeds apace. The virtual admission of Chancellor Bülow, on the occasion of the publication of the Kaiser's interview with the retired English diplomat in October, 1908, that the government's defeat by the reichstag would necessarily involve his resignation will be at once recalled. This promise has been now actually fulfilled, and that suave and genial statesman's retirement, upon the defeat of his budget, advances Germany one step farther toward a modern system of ministerial responsibility to the people's representatives. The appointment of a successor who promises a continuation of Bülow's policy indicates that there are other important steps yet to be taken, but does not obscure the significance of this change of ministers. Within no distant period it is altogether likely we shall see a full-fledged system of political ministerial responsibility to the legislature, with its corollary of effective votes of lack of confidence,—a system in which the reichstag will control the appointment of the incoming ministers as well as force the resignation of those with whom it is no longer in accord. It may therefore not be without a timely interest to review the German doctrine of the budget as a means of control over the executive.

Date: 1910
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