Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do. By Cass R. Sunstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 304p. $29.95

Martin Edelman

American Political Science Review, 2002, vol. 96, issue 4, 813-814

Abstract: A venerable question has once again become a dominant issue confronting public law scholars. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, ostensibly democratic states have emerged throughout the areas formerly designated as the Second and Third Worlds. The establishment of these new regimes has invariably been accompanied by the promulgation of written constitutions. For public law scholars, this sequence has posed the question of the utility of written constitutions: What, if anything, do these documents add to nation, state, and society?

Date: 2002
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