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Interstate Conflict Increases the Appeal of Undemocratic Candidates

Kristian Frederiksen and Lasse Laustsen

British Journal of Political Science, 2025, vol. 55, -

Abstract: How do threats of interstate conflict affect American voters’ propensity to support candidates who violate democratic principles? We argue that undemocratic behavior affects perceived dominance, which citizens value in times of conflict. We fielded two conjoint experiments and a factorial vignette experiment in the United States to test this two-step argument. First, our conjoint experiments demonstrate a robust and strong relationship between undemocratic candidate behavior and dominance impressions. Second, our vignette experiment – manipulating undemocratic behavior by in-party presidential candidates and priming threats of conflict with China and Russia – shows that undemocratic candidates are evaluated more positively under conflict compared to peace. This is especially the case among Republican voters, although the pattern is also evident among Democrats and Independents. Our letter sheds light on the consequences of the escalation of wars with relevance to the United States around the globe, pointing to toleration of undemocratic behavior specifically.

Date: 2025
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