Banks, Kinship, and Economic Development: The New England Case

Naomi R. Lamoreaux

The Journal of Economic History, 1986, vol. 46, issue 3, 647-667

Abstract: Early banks in New England functioned not as commercial banks in the modern sense but as the financial arms of extended kinship networks. These groups used banks to raise capital for their diversified enterprises and give their operations a stable institutional base. Because entry into banking was essentially free, favoritism in credit markets—the usual affliction of such a system—seems to have been unimportant. Instead, the economy as a whole benefited from the ease with which capital could be mobilized for industrial development.

Date: 1986
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