Opportunism and the limits of blockchain as urban land governance: a comparative transaction-cost analysis

Godwin Kavaarpuo, Prince Donkor Ameyaw, Barikisa Owusu Ansah and Elijah Asante Boakye

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2026, vol. 22, -

Abstract: Blockchain is frequently proposed as a solution to tenure insecurity, administrative inefficiencies, and corruption, where conventional land reforms have fallen short. However, evidence of its institutional effectiveness remains limited. Drawing on Williamsonian transaction cost economics and an analytical autoethnographic research design, we undertake a comparative analysis of blockchain’s ability to curb opportunism and safeguard the interests of land-transacting parties relative to Ghana’s customary and statutory land-governance structures. Our findings show that while blockchain performs well at some ex ante safeguards, it offers no clear advantage over existing governance structures at the ex post stage. Of the seven identified forms of post-transaction opportunism that buyers often face, blockchain was superior only in minimising hold-up risks. We conclude with implications for policymakers and technologists considering blockchain adoption.

Date: 2026
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