Moral dissonance and judicial dynamics: a differential model of normative misalignment

Massimiliano Marletta

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2026, vol. 22, e33

Abstract: This article develops a dynamic model of judicial behaviour in which moral alignment operates as an anti-function of judicial utility. The model assumes that moral adherence can generate disutility whenever it conflicts with legal or reputational incentives. Judges maximise a time-dependent utility function driven by normative conformity, reputational rewards, and moral dissonance. Using a system of differential equations, the analysis examines how judicial and social morality co-evolve under competing institutional incentives. The model formalises moral dissonance as an endogenous friction that both destabilises and renews institutional order, transforming moral integrity into a catalyst for normative evolution. This framework provides a micro-dynamic explanation for recurrent moral-legal tensions within judicial institutions.

Date: 2026
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