Reflexivity, relative autonomy and the embedded individual in economics

Chris Fuller

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2013, vol. 9, issue 1, 109-129

Abstract: This paper is about the mind of the embedded individual in heterodox economics. Beginning from Margaret Archer's analysis of modes of reflexivity and following the respective contributions of Geoff Hodgson and John Davis, the paper seeks to integrate into Archer's approach a place for habitual beliefs and an analysis of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the embedded individual. Archer's identification of modes of reflexivity is endorsed but her avoidance of any dispositional place for habit in the mind is questioned. It is argued that by excluding habits in this way, Archer, unlike Davis, implausibly assumes most individuals have achieved relative autonomy in their group associations. The essay develops an approach to the mind that articulates underlying relationships between habits and internal conversation, potentially enriching Archer's explanation of modes of reflexivity while locating Davis's notion of relative autonomy within that framework. Specific economic implications are then briefly considered.

Date: 2013
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