The impact of different distributions of power on access rights to the common wastelands: the Campine, Brecklands and Geest compared

Maïka de Keyzer

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2013, vol. 9, issue 4, 517-542

Abstract: Despite the static image of formal common pool resource institutions (CPRIs), interest communities always attempted to adapt their institutional framework to their particular needs and interests. The hypothesis of Ensminger, that formal and informal institutional environments were steered by the interplay of external socioeconomic factors, ideology and bargaining power, will be tested by a comparative analysis of three regions within the North Sea area, namely the Campine, within the Low Countries, the Brecklands in England and the Geest area in Schleswig Holstein. Due to this scope, we will advance that especially the distribution of power was vital for the evolution of one specific aspect of CPRIs, namely accessibility. Only communities with relatively balanced distributions of power could retain an inclusive access regime throughout the early modern period, while polarised societies evolved towards more restrictive access to the common wastelands.

Date: 2013
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