Nash and Walras Equilibrium

John Geanakoplos ()
Additional contact information
John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/john-geanakoplos

No 1131R3, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with "satisficing improvement," i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the "Satisficing Principle."

Keywords: Equilibrium; Nash; Walras; Brouwer; Kakutani (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1996-10, Revised 2002-02
Note: CFP 1058
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economic Theory (2003), 21(2/3): 585-603

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d11/d1131-r3.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1131r3

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().