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Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

Martin Shubik and Eric Smith
Additional contact information
Eric Smith: Santa Fe Institute

No 1419, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.

Keywords: Strategic market games; Clearinghouses; Credit evaluation; Default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D40 D50 G10 G20 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2003-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-gth and nep-ind
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Published in Economic Theory (March 2007), 30(3): 587-597

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Journal Article: Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry (2007) Downloads
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