Grading Exams: 100, 99,..., 1 or A, B, C? Incentives in Games of Status

Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos ()
Additional contact information
John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/john-geanakoplos

No 1467, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We show that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100,99,...,1), but instead by clumping them in broad categories (A,B,C). If their abilities are disparate, the optimal grading scheme awards fewer A's than there are alpha-quality students, creating small elites. If their abilities are common knowledge, then it is better to grade them on an absolute scale (100 to 90 is an A, etc.) rather than on a curve (top 15% is an A, etc.). We develop criteria for optimal grading schemes in terms of the stochastic dominance between student performances.

Keywords: Status; Incentives; Education; Grading; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 I20 I30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-edu
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d14/d1467.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1467

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().