Take a Break: A Model of Fatigue, Recovery, and the Economics of Remote Work

Maria Saez Marti
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Maria Saez Marti: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/lecturers/maria-saez-marti

No 2268R1, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: I propose a model in which workers experience fatigue over time and can restore productivity by taking breaks. Optimal schedules feature evenly spaced, full-recovery breaks; when breaks are costless, they should occur frequently, but switching costs make the optimal number finite. The model is embedded in a principal-agent framework with contractual frictions. When employers control the schedule, workers overwork; when workers self-manage, they overrest. Both lead to inefficiencies. These results shed light on the trade-offs in remote work arrangements, especially following COVID-19. The analysis highlights how control rights, incentive design, and recovery constraints interactÑand why neither rigid supervision nor full autonomy guarantees efficiency.

Keywords: Labor supply; fatigue; rest breaks; productivity; remote work; principal-agent problem; control rights; incomplete contracts; time allocation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D86 J22 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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