Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms

Yusuke Narita, Chiaki Moriguchi and Mari Tanaka
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Yusuke Narita: Yale University

No 2390, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: What happens if selective colleges change their admission policies? We study this question by analyzing the worldÕs first implementation of nationally centralized meritocratic admissions in the early twentieth century. We find a persistent meritocracy-equity tradeoff. Compared to the decentralized system, the centralized system admitted more high-achievers and produced more occupational elites (such as top income earners) decades later in the labor market. This gain came at a distributional cost, however. Meritocratic centralization also increased the number of urban-born elites relative to rural-born ones, undermining equal access to higher education and career advancement.

Pages: 89 pages
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-ure
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https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2024-05/d2390.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms (2025)
Working Paper: Meritocracy and Its Discontent: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms (2020)
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