Labor Market Matching, Wages, and Amenities

Thibaut Lamadon, Jeremy Lise, Costas Meghir and Jean-Marc Robin
Additional contact information
Thibaut Lamadon: University of Chicago
Jeremy Lise: Cornell University
Costas Meghir: Yale University

No 2396, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper develops the nonparametric identification of models with production complementarities, worker-firm specific disutility of labor and search frictions. Mobility in the model is subject to preference shocks, and we assume that firms can write wage contracts. We develop a constructive proof for the nonparametric identification of the model primitives from matched employer-employee data. We use the estimated model to decompose the sources of wage dispersion into worker heterogeneity, compensating differentials, and search frictions that generate between-firm and within-firm dispersion. We find that compensating differentials are substantial on average, but the contribution differs greatly between the lowest and highest types of workers. Finally, we use the model to provide an economic interpretation of several empirical regularities.

Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-lab and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2024-07/d2396_0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Labor Market Matching, Wages, and Amenities (2024)
Working Paper: Labor Market Matching, Wages, and Amenities (2024)
Working Paper: Labour market matching, wages, and amenities (2024)
Working Paper: Labor Market Matching, Wages, and Amenities (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2396

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().