Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection

Girija Borker, Jan Eeckhout, Nancy Luke, Shantidani Minz, Kaivan Munshi and Soumya Swaminathan
Additional contact information
Girija Borker: DIME, World Bank & IZA
Nancy Luke: Pennsylvania State University
Shantidani Minz: Christian Medical College, Vellore
Kaivan Munshi: Yale University and Toulouse School of Economics
Soumya Swaminathan: World Health Organization

No 2408, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference in which parents desire a male heir and daughter aversion in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing micro-foundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.

Pages: 54pages
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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