How can economic schemes curtail the increasing sex ratio at birth in China?

Debarun Bhattacharjya, Anant Sudarshan, Shripad Tuljapurkar, Ross Shachter and Marcus Feldman
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Debarun Bhattacharjya: Stanford University
Anant Sudarshan: Stanford University
Shripad Tuljapurkar: Stanford University
Ross Shachter: Stanford University
Marcus Feldman: Stanford University

Demographic Research, 2008, vol. 19, issue 54, 1831-1850

Abstract: Fertility decline, driven by the one-child policy, and son preference have contributed to an alarming difference in the number of live male and female births in China. We present a quantitative model where people choose to sex-select because they perceive that married sons are more valuable than married daughters. Due to the predominant patrilocal kinship system in China, daughters-in-law provide valuable emotional and financial support, enhancing the perceived present value of married sons. We argue that inter-generational transfer data will help ascertain the extent to which economic schemes (such as pension plans for families with no sons) can curtail the increasing sex ratio at birth.

Keywords: sex ratio at birth; son preference; sex selection; sex-selective potency; value of child (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dem:demres:v:19:y:2008:i:54

DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.54

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