Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences

Chia-Hui Chen, Junichiro Ishida and Wing Suen

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.

Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1103.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences (2022)
Working Paper: Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences (2021)
Working Paper: Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1103

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