Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game

Michalis Drouvelis, Nobuyuki Hanaki and Yuta Shimodaira ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer’s endowment. Although these added options lead the responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence the proposers’ behavior. It is only when the proposers can give, and the responders can concurrently destroy the endowment of the proposers that the proposers take significantly less from the responders.

Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1262.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Giving and Costless Retaliation in the Power-to-Take Game (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1262

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().