Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game

Michalis Drouvelis, Nobuyuki Hanaki and Yuta Shimodaira ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, proposers can give part of their endowment to responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, responders can destroy the proposers’ endowment. Although these additional options lead responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence proposers’ behavior. Only when proposers can give and responders can concurrently destroy proposers’ endowments do proposers take significantly less from the responders.

Date: 2024-11, Revised 2025-05
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https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1262R.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game (2024)
Working Paper: Giving and Costless Retaliation in the Power-to-Take Game (2023)
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