Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence

Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo, Hanming Fang and Kenneth I. Spenner

No 10-26, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We argue that once we take into account the students' rational enrollment decisions, mismatch in the sense that the intended beneficiary of affirmative action admission policies are made worse o could occur only if selective universities possess private information about students' post-enrollment treatment effects. This necessary condition for mismatch provides the basis for a new test. We propose an empirical methodology to test for private information in such a setting. The test is implemented using data from Campus Life and Learning Project (CLL) at Duke. Evidence shows that Duke does possess private information that is a statistically significant predictor of the students' post-enrollment academic performance. We also propose strategies to evaluate more conclusively whether the evidence of Duke private information has generated mismatch.

Keywords: Mismatch; Private information; Affirmative Action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 I28 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence (2011)
Working Paper: Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:duk:dukeec:10-26

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