Environmental Games and Queue Models

Charles Tapiero ()
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Charles Tapiero : ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P.105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX , FRANCE,

No DR 03013, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper considers a pollution and control game which uses a queuing framework. This framework allows an accounting of pollution events, environmental pollution quality and the application of controls to maintain a desirable quality of the environment. A number of examples are used to highlight the approach and demonstrates both its theoretical and practical usefulness.

Keywords: Environment; Control; Quality; Queuing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q21 Q26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2003-11
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