A Stackelberg Game Model of Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices

Kenji Fujiwara ()

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 12, issue 12, 1-9

Abstract: We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each point of time. Then, we compare the resulting outcomes with those in a Stackelberg model without price stickiness.

Keywords: dynamic; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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