Protection, Alliance and Negotiation against a Terrorist Threat

Sylvain Baumann (), Pedro Lages dos santos (), Samir Amine and Fabrice Valognes
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Sylvain Baumann: University of Le Havre
Pedro Lages dos santos: University of Le Havre

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 3214-3221

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the decision-making process of a targeted country threatened by a terrorist group. This country has the choice between improving his arms, forming an alliance with a border country or negotiating with the terrorists. However, his resource do not enable him to have a complete alliance or to pay the total ransom. The government has to do an arbitrage among the strategies. After determining the equilibrium, we focus on the effects of each parameters.

Keywords: Conflict; Security; Terrorism; Alliance; Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-23
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