The construction of choice. A computational voting model

Luigi Marengo () and Corrado Pasquali ()
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Corrado Pasquali: Università di Teramo

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 4, 3077-3087

Abstract: Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained, depending upon initial conditions and agenda, intransitive cycles and median voter dominance may be made appear or disappear, and that, finally, decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.

Keywords: Voting; Social choice; Agenda power; Power; Voting paradox; Median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The construction of choice: a computational voting model (2011)
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