On Fostering International Public Good Provision: Would Complementarity between Public Good and In-Kind Transfers Help?

Karen Pittel () and Dirk Rübbelke ()
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Karen Pittel: Ifo Institute and University of Munich
Dirk Rübbelke: Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Dirk T.G. Rübbelke

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 3, 1638-1644

Abstract: A large strand of literature investigates the effects of transfers on the provision of international public goods and on the welfare of donor and recipient. We consider the special case where transfers are conditional on the recipient's contribution to the public good. Transfers take the shape of specific private good transfers which, however, also affect the recipient's benefits from the public good. Public good and in-kind transfers may either be complements or substitutes. As we show, the profitability of adaptation transfers depends only partly on whether the public good and transferred private goods are complements or substitutes. Decisive is rather the strengths of income and substitution effects generated through the transfers.

Keywords: Voluntary Provision of Public Goods; Conditional Transfers; International Climate Policy; Complements; Substitutes; Welfare Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-01040

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