Does technical assistance weaken tax competition?

Shingo Yamazaki ()
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Shingo Yamazaki: Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University

Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 3, 1595-1602

Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between technical assistance and tax competition between countries, and finds that technical assistance can be given voluntarily without altruism or moral obligation since technical assistance can weaken tax competition and improve the societal welfare. Technical assistance is provided by a country with high productivity to a country with low productivity to help in the production of public goods. This technical assistance would lower the marginal cost of public goods in the recipient country. This effect would lead to the recipient country raising its tax rate and the donor country too would then increase its tax rate in response to this change.

Keywords: Tax competition; Technical assistance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08-16
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