On the Likelihood of the Coincidence of Condorcet Committees

Eric Kamwa and Vincent Merlin ()

Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 3, 2076-2085

Abstract: In this paper, we supplement the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2017) for the selection of a subset of two alternatives out of four by computing the conditional probability of voting situations under which the Condorcet Committee à la Gehrlein (CCG) and the Condorcet Committee à la Fishburn (CCF) may both exist and coincide when voters' preferences on candidates are lexicographically extended on subsets. The CCG is a fixed-size subset of candidates such that each of its members defeats in a pairwise contest any candidate outside. The CCF is a fixed-size subset of candidates that is preferred to all other subsets of the same size by a majority of voters.

Keywords: Condorcet Committees; Preference; Lexicographic extension; Impartial culture. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-27
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Likelihood of the Coincidence of Condorcet Committees (2017)
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