Intergroup Conflict with Intragroup Altruism

Wei Hu () and Nicolas Treich
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Wei Hu: ETH-Zürich, Switzerland

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 2, 720-724

Abstract: In this paper, we consider an intergroup contest game with intragroup altruism. We show that more altruism within a group increases conflict intensity by increasing total groups' efforts. Moreover, we show that, unlike the celebrated Olson's group size paradox, group size increases the probability of winning the contest provided that intragroup altruism is high enough.

Keywords: Altruism; Contest; Conflict; Group size paradox. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-15
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