A note on stable cartels

Liang Mao ()

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 3, 1338-1342

Abstract: Non-cooperative cartel formation games usually carry the assumption that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members' actions.

Keywords: cartel formation; stable cartel; self-enforcing agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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