Optimal policy mix in an endogenous timing with a consumer-friendly public firm

Arturo Garcia, Mariel Leal () and Sang-Ho Lee
Additional contact information
Mariel Leal: Technologico de Monterrey, Mexico

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 3, 1438-1445

Abstract: This study considers a mixed duopoly with a consumer-friendly public firm and analyzes an endogenous timing game in the presence of output subsidy and emission tax. We find that regardless of the policy mix, the equilibrium of endogenous market structure is determined by the public firm's concern on consumer surplus. We also show that the optimal policy mix can attain the first-best allocation for social welfare only when both firms have symmetric payoffs, which results in simultaneous-move outcome.

Keywords: endogenous timing game; consumer-friendly public firm; emission tax; output subsidy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2018/Volume38/EB-18-V38-I3-P135.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00513

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().