On a trade-off in the evolution of ownership

Miyashita Haruki ()
Additional contact information
Miyashita Haruki: University of Tsukuba

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 3, 1257-1260

Abstract: This paper shows that the emergence of ownership faces a trade-off between interacting group size in a population and the fighting cost for resources in a Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game played by entities in the population. More precisely, for each fighting cost, large size of the group induces neutral stability of the Bourgeois whereas small size ensures evolutionary stability of the Hawk. Each player's adaption process is supposed as follows : At each period, a sub-group of the population is randomly drawn, and the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game is played in the group. Each player in a group observes the payoff distribution of the members in the group and switches own strategy to one with higher payoff.

Keywords: Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game; Evolutionary dynamics; Local matching structure; NSS; ESS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2018/Volume38/EB-18-V38-I3-P120.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00528

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().