How much can we identify from repeated games?

Jose Abito () and Cuicui Chen ()
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Jose Abito: University of Pennsylvania, Business Economics and Public Policy
Cuicui Chen: State University of New York (SUNY) at Albany

Economics Bulletin, 2021, vol. 41, issue 3, 1212-1222

Abstract: We propose a strategy to identify structural parameters in infinitely repeated games without relying on equilibrium selection assumptions. We exploit the extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set to construct bounds on the frequencies of stage game actions, which then impose restrictions on the parameters of interest. To illustrate the identification strategy, we use an infinitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma to get bounds on a utility parameter and a common discount factor.

Keywords: Identification; Repeated Games; Bounds; Multiple Equilibria; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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