Entry in Tax Competition and Intergovernmental Transfer

Yuya Kikuchi ()
Additional contact information
Yuya Kikuchi: Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University

Economics Bulletin, 2021, vol. 41, issue 4, 2445-2450

Abstract: This paper proposes an efficient intergovernmental transfer system within fiscal competition settings under the endogenization of the number of regions that engage in fiscal competition. In our theoretical model, two externalities arise, namely: (1) fiscal externalities; and (2) externalities resulting from the endogenization of the number of regions. If a system is a full equalization system, inefficiencies in the public input supply and the number of competing regions are resolvable. This is because the two externalities can be internalized.

Keywords: Tax Competition; Intergovernmental Transfers; Region Entry; Public input (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-29
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2021/Volume41/EB-21-V41-I4-P211.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-21-00604

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().