A decomposition of strategy-proofness in discrete resource allocation problems

Hidekazu Anno () and Sui Takahashi ()
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Hidekazu Anno: University of Tsukuba
Sui Takahashi: University of Tsukuba

Economics Bulletin, 2022, vol. 42, issue 1, 49 - 59

Abstract: This note provides a characterization of strategy-proofness in discrete resource allocation problems. Based on it, we establish a theorem that has the following two corollaries: (i) the student-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) rule for college admission problems is strategy-proof for students and (ii) the top-trading cycles (TTC) rule for housing markets is strategy-proof.

Keywords: Market design; Two-sided matching market; Indivisible goods allocation problem; Core; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-20
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