A note on strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences

Dolors Berga ()
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Dolors Berga: Universitat de Girona

Economics Bulletin, 2025, vol. 45, issue 4, 1666 - 1671

Abstract: This note integrates the role of Nash independence of irrelevant alternatives with the axioms of strategy-proofness and plateau-onliness to develop a recursive procedure over the number of agents for the construction of rules characterized as a class of admissible social choice functions in one pure public good economies with single-plateaued preferences.

Keywords: Strategy-proof; Single-plateaued preferences; Plateau-only; Nash Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12-30
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