Union Membership and Wage Bargaining When Membership is Not Compulsory

Alison Booth and Monojit Chatterji

Economic Journal, 1995, vol. 105, issue 429, 345-60

Abstract: This paper provides a formal model of union wage and membership determination where the union is recognized for bargaining purposes, where membership of the union is not compulsory, and where the union faces a budget constraint in its organization activities. This simultaneous equation model is then used as the basis for estimation of manual wages and union density for the private sector using the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1995
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Related works:
Working Paper: Union Membership and Wage Bargaining When Membership is Not Compulsory (1994)
Working Paper: UNION MEMBERSHIP AND WAGE BARGAINING WHEN MEMBERSHIP IS NOT COMPULSORY
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