Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
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Ilan Guttman: Stanford University
Ilan Kremer: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We study a dynamic strategic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of information. Such situations are prevalent in real life, e.g., in corporate disclosure environments that are characterized by information asymmetry between the firm and the capital market with respect to whether, when, and what private information the firm has learned. We show (perhaps surprisingly) that due to dynamic strategic interaction between the firm and the capital market later disclosures are interpreted more favorably. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies.

Date: 2012-04
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Journal Article: Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure (2014)
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