Bargaining models in opinion dynamics

Xi Zheng, Xi Lu, Felix T.S. Chan, Yong Deng and Zhen Wang

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2015, vol. 251, issue C, 162-168

Abstract: How to reach consensus is the central problem in the research of opinion dynamics. Here we propose the bargaining models under the framework of game theory to involve the non-linearity of opinion dynamics. In this new setup, a dynamic bargaining power is presented to represent the individual difference, which can help to evaluate the profit of changing opinion. Moreover, two types of bargaining models are proposed due to the difference of choosing neighbors. Via numerous simulations, it is unveiled that, with an appropriate environment, both models could lead to the consensus in majority cases, which further enriches the context of opinion dynamics.

Keywords: Consensus; Bargaining power; Game theory; Bayesian updating rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:251:y:2015:i:c:p:162-168

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2014.11.053

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