Evolution of cooperation among fairness-seeking agents in spatial public goods game

Hong Zhang

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2025, vol. 489, issue C

Abstract: The evolution of cooperation is a pivotal area of study, essential for understanding the survival and success of complex biological and social systems. This paper investigates the dynamics of cooperation in spatial public goods games (SPGG) through a model that incorporates a fairness-driven migration mechanism. In this model, agents move towards environments perceived as fairer, influencing the spatial distribution and overall level of cooperation within the population. We examine the interplay between the time scale ratio, noise in movement, and population density. Our analysis reveals that moderate levels of movement and noise are critical for forming and maintaining cooperative clusters, while excessive movement and noise disrupt these structures, leading to reduced cooperation. Higher enhancement factors increase the resilience of cooperative behavior, extending the range of movement intensity over which high cooperation levels are maintained. Population density significantly impacts cooperative dynamics, with high-density environments promoting the coexistence of cooperators and defectors but lowering the highest achievable cooperation levels due to increased exploitation. Our findings underscore the importance of balancing movement, noise, and density to sustain cooperation and stable social structures. This research provides valuable insights for designing interventions and policies to promote cooperative behavior and social cohesion in complex populations. Future studies should further explore the adaptive mechanisms that dynamically adjust movement and strategy adaptation based on local environmental conditions.

Keywords: Spatial public goods game (SPGG); Fairness; Mobility; Noise; Cooperation dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:489:y:2025:i:c:s0096300324006441

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.129183

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