 Leveraging surrounding past strategies to maintain cooperation in the perverse prisoner's dilemmaAkihiro Takahara and Tomoko Sakiyama Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2025, vol. 493, issue C Abstract: In spatial game theory, developed models preserving cooperators often incorporate memory to enhance realism. This study examined the role of memory in a spatial prisoner's dilemma. In the proposed model, all players use their own and their neighbors’ past memories and current states to update strategies under specific conditions. When a player's score is lower than that of a neighbor using the same strategy, and that neighbor has the highest score among all neighbors, the player revisits past strategies and adopts a less experienced strategy. This rule adjusts behavior under unfavorable conditions. Results showed that the proposed model effectively retains cooperators. Previous studies have often necessitated the use of long-term memory and intricate systems; however, the present model eliminates these requirements. Instead, it sustains cooperation by employing a strategy that relies on minimal historical information when determining the subsequent course of action. Keywords: Spatial prisoner's dilemma; Memory; Evolution; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:493:y:2025:i:c:s0096300324007331 DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.129272 Access Statistics for this article Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier |
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