Maintenance and collapse of cooperation driven by bounded rationality in structured populations

Luhe Yang, Duoxing Yang, Siqi Zhang, Feng Yang and Lianzhong Zhang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2026, vol. 202, issue P2

Abstract: The maintenance of long-term stability in human cooperation presents fundamental challenges from self-interested behaviors in social dilemmas. We construct a micro-dynamic model unifying reinforcement learning and Prospect Theory to investigate the evolution of human cooperation driven by bounded rationality. Through Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice, we explore the emergence, maintenance, and collapse of cooperation in public goods games, with emphasis on psychological reference points and initial conditions. The system converges to a high-cooperation static equilibrium when cooperators exhibit lower greediness than defectors. Conversely, reversed greediness asymmetry triggers cascading collapse via localized clusters comprising low-probability cooperators. Supercritical initial cooperation enables defector-resistant static equilibrium, whereas subcritical values drive the system toward low-cooperation dynamic equilibrium. The framework establishes predictive criteria for cooperation sustainability versus collapse, offering actionable insights for public governance and collective risk mitigation.

Keywords: Decision-making; Bounded rationality; Social dilemma; Evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:202:y:2026:i:p2:s0960077925015632

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117550

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