Name as incentive: Political accountability without re-election

Bo Wang and Dandan Zhao

Economic Modelling, 2025, vol. 151, issue C

Abstract: We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to examine politician selection and accountability in settings where officeholders are not subject to re-election. Our analysis shows that the name market can address both issues. By enabling the acquisition of a reputable name, the market serves as a screening mechanism for identifying competent politicians, while also incentivizing incumbents to maintain a positive reputation. Notably, the name market contributes to political accountability by influencing the selection process itself. Furthermore, we demonstrate that exposure to social networking services (SNS) crowds out the name market, thereby exacerbating the difficulties of maintaining accountability. Our model offers new insights into the regulatory implications of SNS in political environments.

Keywords: Political accountability; Politician selection; Name market; Social networking services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:151:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325001671

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107172

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