Measuring domination in matching-network configurations

Zhiwei Cui and Yan-An Hwang

Economic Modelling, 2025, vol. 151, issue C

Abstract: A matching-network configuration consists of a directed network with a finite set of nodes, a finite set of agents, and a matching between the set of nodes and the set of agents. The directed network represents the dominance or dependence relationships between entities, and the matching represents agents’ ownership of entities. We introduce four relational power measures for the set of agents, the β-measure, the score-measure, the β-hybrid-measure, and the score-hybrid-measure. When each agent is matched to only one node, and vice versa, the β- and β-hybrid-measures are reduced to the β-measure in the directed network, and the score- and score-hybrid-measures are reduced to the score-measure in the directed network. We show that the four relational power measures can be axiomatically characterized by the same symmetry axiom, the same individual independence (or individual monotonicity) axiom, and four different efficiency axioms.

Keywords: Matching-network configuration; β-measure; score-measure; β-hybrid-measure; score-hybrid-measure; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:151:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325002111

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107216

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