On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

Ata Atay and Tamás Solymosi

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, issue C, 99-103

Abstract: We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).

Keywords: Bargaining set; Core; Matching market; Assignment game; Cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:167:y:2018:i:c:p:99-103

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022

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