 A vaccination game based on public health actions and personal decisionsP.H.T. Schimit and L.H.A. Monteiro Ecological Modelling, 2011, vol. 222, issue 9, 1651-1655 Abstract: Susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) models are commonly used for representing the spread of contagious diseases. A SIR model can be described in terms of a probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA), where each individual (corresponding to a cell of the PCA lattice) is connected to others by a random network favoring local contacts. Here, this framework is employed for investigating the consequences of applying vaccine against the propagation of a contagious infection, by considering vaccination as a game, in the sense of game theory. In this game, the players are the government and the susceptible newborns. In order to maximize their own payoffs, the government attempts to reduce the costs for combating the epidemic, and the newborns may be vaccinated only when infective individuals are found in their neighborhoods and/or the government promotes an immunization program. As a consequence of these strategies supported by cost-benefit analysis and perceived risk, numerical simulations show that the disease is not fully eliminated and the government implements quasi-periodic vaccination campaigns. Keywords: Complex network; Game theory; Probabilistic cellular automaton; SIR model; Vaccination (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecomod:v:222:y:2011:i:9:p:1651-1655 DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2011.02.019 Access Statistics for this article Ecological Modelling is currently edited by Brian D. Fath More articles in Ecological Modelling from Elsevier |
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