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A directed search model of intermediated trade

Javier Fernandez ()

European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 8, 1481-1494

Abstract: This paper complements Antràs and Costinot's (2010) analysis of a two-good, two-country Ricardian economy in which farmers produce either goods but require intermediaries to exchange their production in the goods markets. The intermediation market is frictional, whereas the goods market is perfectly competitive. Unlike their random-search-and-price-bargaining setup, intermediaries herein post intermediation prices and farmers direct their search. Contrary to their findings, we show that opening the economy to international trade always leads to welfare gains. This is the case because domestic farmers benefit from relatively efficient intermediation technologies in terms of higher matching probabilities but also lower intermediation prices.

Keywords: Ricardian economy; Directed search; Price posting; Coordination frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 F10 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1481-1494

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.08.002

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