Private brand encroachment and channel structure in a hybrid platform

Chong Zhang, Yi Zhu, Yu Zhang and Yuliang Ma

European Journal of Operational Research, 2026, vol. 331, issue 1, 77-91

Abstract: Nowadays, major online platforms offer the hybrid channel for manufacturers. Therefore, the manufacturer has the option to select from three channel structures: reselling channel, agency selling channel, and hybrid channel. To break through the limitations of simply providing platform services and retail channels, many online platforms introduce private brands to compete with manufacturers. In this research, we construct a game-theoretic model to examine the interplay between the manufacturer’s channel structure and the online platform’s private brand encroachment strategy. Through comparative and equilibrium analyses, some interesting results are found. First, when the commission fee is relatively low, PBE has the potential to inhibit the escalation of the wholesale price and alleviate the double marginalization effect. Second, without private brand, the hybrid channel is not a good option for the manufacturer. However, the private brand encroachment strategy of the online platform substantially increases the manufacturer’s motivation to choose the hybrid channel. The private brand encroachment strategy and the channel strategy have asymmetric mixed relationship of complementarity and substitutability. Third, when the commission fee is low, PB with far less market potential or quality than specialized manufacturers still have value to introduce. Finally, several extended analyses are conducted to verify the robustness of the results and more interesting implications are derived.

Keywords: Supply chain management; Private brand encroachment; Channel structure; Online platform; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221725007672
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:331:y:2026:i:1:p:77-91

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2025.09.030

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().